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KENTUcKY LAW JouRNAL
KENTUCKY PASSES A RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES ACT*
INTRODUCTION
The Kentucky Retail Installment Sales Act, effective January 1,
1963, provides for most of the essential consumer oriented safeguards
which have been recognized as desirable in the many states that have
enacted retail installment sales legislation. State regulation in this
field began in 1935 when Indiana passed the first such law.1 Since
then, thirty-one states have adopted similar measures. The impetus
toward state regulation of the retail installment sale is attributable
mainly to volume. In 1939, the total amount of retail installment
credit for the entire country was 4.5 billion dollars, but by November
1962, it had risen to over 47 billion dollars. 2 The volume of installment
credit indicates the number of people affected by the installment
sale. This great number coupled with the possibility of abuses clearly
justifies state regulation in this field.
The act, by its terms, addresses itself to the retail installment
contract and the seller and does not speak in express terms of the
financing agency except in reference to the "holder" of the contract.
Yet clearly, the financing agency is more affected by the act than the
seller since the agency finances the installment sale and the installment
sales contract is prepared by, discounted to, and enforced by the
financing agency. Therefore, in studying the act, attention should be
focused on the rights and duties it created in banks, finance companies,
and other financing agencies engaged in retail installment financing.
Excluding motor vehicles, the act relates to the sale of goods.
3
"Goods" as defined in the act means all tangible chattels purchased
primarily for personal use as distinguished from commercial, indus-
trial, or agricultural use.4 Generally, the act applies to all retail in-
stallment sales of goods (a) evidenced by a retail installment sales
contract, 5 (b) entered into in this state,6 and (c) payable in one or
Ky. Rev. Stat. ch. 371 (1962).
1 Ind. Stat. Ann. § 58-901 to 58-945 (1951).
2 Of this, over 19 billion dollars was automobile paper and over 12 billion
dollars was other consumer goods paper. 49 Fed. Reserve Bull. 64 (1963).
3 Installment motor vehicle sales are covered by Ky. Rev. Stat. ch. 190 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as KRS1.4 KRS 371.210(1).
5 The retail installment sales contract may include a chattel mortgage, a
security agreement, a conditional sales contract, and a contract in the form of a
bailment or a lease if the bailee or lessee agrees to pay for their use a sum
substantially equivalent to or in excess of the value of the goods sold, and if the
bailee or lessee has the option to become, or is bound to become, the owner of
the goods upon full compliance with the provisions of the contract. KRS
371.210(7).
6 KRS 371.210(7).
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more installments.7 Prior to the passage of the new act, the Kentucky
retail consumer who bought on time had to look primarily to the
Petty Loan Act,8 the usury laws,9 or the common law of conditional
sales for protection. There was a catalogue of abuses not protected by
this body of law, resulting from such situations as the lack of dis-
closure requirements, excessive finance charges, and the absence of a
right of prepayment. This act, which is in line with current state
regulation of the installment sales field, is an attempt to remedy some
of these abuses.
The Usury Laws and the Retail Installment Sale. The retail con-
sumer who wishes to buy tangible personal property'on time usually
chooses between one of the two chief methods of financing such a
transaction. First, he may obtain a direct loan from a bank or other
financing agency and then pay the retail dealer the cash sale price of
the purchased goods. Under this method, the consumer agrees to
repay the financing agency in installments over a period of time. The
maximum interest that the financing agency may charge is governed
by the usury statute.10 The other chief method of financing the pur-
chase is by the retail installment sale, the characteristic feature of
this method being the installment sales contract. In this transaction
the retail buyer receives the goods from the seller, after making a down
payment, and contracts to repay the balance in installments over a
certain period of time. As is the usual practice, the financing agency
supplies the retail seller with the installment sales contract. The seller
determines the finance charge by referring to the financing agency's
rate schedule and adds this amount to the cash sale price. After the
buyer has signed the contract, it is "discounted" to the financing
agency, who enforces it. However, in this latter method of sales
financing, it is the majority view that the usury laws do not apply.'1
7KRS 3871.210(6).
8 KRS ch. 288.
9 KRS Ch. 360.
lo KBS 360.010 provides that the maximum legal bank interest rate is six
per cent per annum. Some financing agencies in Kentucky are permitted to
charge in excess of the legal interest rate. For the charges that a petty loan
company may make, see KRS 288.530.
"1Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1860); Beete v. Bidgood, 7
B. & C. 453, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827). Colorado and Texas have
codified the rule by statute. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-16-1 (8) (Supp. 1957);
Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. Art. 5074a (Supp. 1959). A few jurisdictions, however,
have held that under certain circumstances installment sales are within the usury
statutes. Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d
973 (1952); Powell v. Edwards, 162 Neb. 11, 75 N.W.2d 122 (1956); G.F.C.
Corp. v. Williams, 231 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950; Kentucky follows the
majority view. Munson v. White, 309 Ky. 295, 217 S.W.2d 641 (1949); Cart-
wright v. C.I.T. Corp., 253 Ky. 690, 70 S.W. 2d 388 (1934).
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It would seem that there would be no basis for such a distinction
since both methods are so strikingly similar. In both cases the buyer
defers payment over a period, paying an amount in excess of the cash
sale price for this privilege. In both cases the financing agency, not
the seller, finances the transaction. The distinction is best explained
by history. During the era in which the usury statutes were enacted,
there was little installment buying, the statutes being aimed primarily
at the direct loan.12 As installment buying began to increase, the
courts held that a retail seller may choose, at his discretion, one price
for a cash sale and another for an installment sale. The famous
rationale of the Missouri Supreme Court best explains the policy basis:
The reason is that the statute against usury is striking at and forbidding
the exaction or receipt of more than a specified legal rate for the hire of
money and not anything else; and a purchaser is not like the needy
borrower, a victim of a rapacious lender, since he can refrain from the
purchase if he does not choose to pay the price asked by the seller.' 3
This reasoning seems outdated today since one may need an article of
personal property just as desperately as a loan. The distinction has
been criticized by many writers.14 However, the doctrine has been
recognized for so long in the majority of jurisdictions that it is doubt-
ful whether many courts will change their positions.' 5 Clearly this
problem is in the lap of the state legislatures.
REG LAToRY FEAruts OF Tm Acr
Disclosure. Generally a financing agency furnishes the retail seller
with the printed contract forms. 16 The buyer's participation in the
contract is usually limited to the signing of his name, often without
giving the contract more than a cursory glance. This setting encour-
ages the camouflage of important contract provisions such as the lack
of separation of price and charges, the concealment of important
terms in fine print, and the leaving of blank spaces to be filled in
after the buyer has signed. The new act squarely meets these prob-
lems. The pertinent disclosure provisions of the act require that the
contract be in writing, dated, signed by the buyer, and completed
12Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Installment Sales, 68
Yale L.J. 839, 842 (1959).
13 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 77-78,
262 S.W. 425, 428 (1924).
14Warren, supra note 12, at 842; Comment, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 801, 303
(1960); Berger, Usury in Installment Sales, 48 Yale L.J. 1102 (1939).
15 But see position taken by the Arkansas, Texas, and Nebraska courts, supra
note 11.
16See generally Adelson, The Mechanics of the Installment Credit Sale, 2
Law & Contemp. Prob. 218 (1935).
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as to all essential provisions; 17 that the terms of the contract be made
clear, including the itemizing of the cash price, down payment, ag-
gregate amount of insurance, aggregate amount of official fees, prin-
cipal balance, amount of the time price differential (finance charge),
and time balance; 18 that the printed portion of the contract be in a
size equal to at least eight point type;19 that the buyer may request
and receive a statement of account balance when desired;20 and that a
"balloon" payment be itemized.2' Such provisions are standard and
largely non-controversial.22  Clearly provisions requiring disclosure
represent one of the basic philosophies of retail installment sales
legislation.
23
Right of Prepayment and Rebate. Every state passing a retail
installment sales act has permitted the buyer to prepay the time
balance and receive a rebate.24 Such a provision strikes at one of the
most serious abuses in the installment sale since some financing agencies
have refused rebate on prepayment on the theory that the finance
charge is part of the time sale price.25 The act provides that upon
prepayment the buyer is entitled to a rebate computed by apportion-
ing the finance charge after deducting a maximum of ten dollars,
except that an amount less than one dollar need not be refunded.26
Consolidation. If a buyer purchases goods from a seller from
whom he has previously purchased under a retail installment sales
cotract, it may be to the buyer's advantage to consolidate the con-
tracts. This is true because it may be financially easier for the buyer
to make one payment than several. The new act provides for such
a contingency.27 In the event of consolidation of an outstanding
contract with a new one, it is sufficient if the seller supplies the buyer
with a written memorandum of the new purchase which itemizes all
the essential terms of the consolidation.
28
17 KRS 871.220 (1).
18KRS 871.220(5).
19 KI1S 871.220 (2).2 0 KRS 871.280.
21KRS 871.220(5). Balloon payment contracts schedule a substantially
higher final payment than the preceding ones. Such a device is sometimes used to
induce refinancing. The buyer becomes accustomed to paying the smaller in-
stallments, but when the final installment becomes due, he finds himself unable
to meet it. The result is that he is often forced to refinance the contract on the
terms of the financing a ency.2 2 Britton & Ulrich, The Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act-Historical
Background and Comparative Legislation, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 137, 158 (1958).
23 Comment, 45 Marq. L. Rev. 555, 570 (1960).
24 Id. at 575.
25 Britton & Ulricb, supra note 22, at 168.
26 KRS 371.260(2).
27 KBS 871.290.
2 8 KBS 371.290(2).
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Delinquency charges. Most retail installment sales contracts pro-
vide that if the buyer fails to meet an installment when due, the
financing agency may assess a delinquency charge. This would appear
to be a fair procedure since the finance charge in the contract is
computed in advance under the assumption that all installments will
be promptly met. When an installment is not paid as agreed, the
precomputed finance charge does not reflect the actual situation.
Therefore, the financing agency should be compensated for the
necessary adjustment. However, the delinquency charge may become
an instrument of abuse. A financing agency may be encouraged to
let installments fall overdue in the hope of extra income.29 Also the
financing agency may assess an exorbitant delinquency charge since
the majority rule is that such charges are outside the usury statutes.30
The new act effectively combats these abuses. It provides for a ten
day grace period, after each installment falls due, during which the
delinquency charge may not be made.31 This gives the tardy buyer
ample time. Secondly, the act provides for a maximum delinquency
charge.
32
Refinancing. When a buyer finds himself unable to keep up the
installments on his contract at the scheduled payment rate, he may
want to refinance the obligation to permit him to make payments of a
lesser amount. The refinancing of an installment sale bears a strong
resemblance to the direct loan, which is subject to the usury statutes.m
Therefore, regulation of one and not the other may not be justified.
The act provides that, at the buyer's request to refinance the contract,
a refinance charge may be assessed not to exceed a maximum pro-
vided for in two optional methods of computation.
3 5
Retail Charge Agreements. Retail charge agreements (commonly
called revolving credit plans) represent one of the newest techniques
in ready consumer financing.-3  Nearly every large department store
2 9 Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 44 Cornell
L.Q. 38, 60 (1958).
3 0 Gerber, Do Late Charges in Excess of the Usury Statutes Constitute Usury?,
12 Personal Finance L.Q. 62 (1958).
31 KRS 371.270(1).32 The delinquency charge may not exceed five per cent of each installment
or five dollars, whichever is less, provided that a minimum charge of one dollar
may be made, or in lieu thereof, interest after maturity on each such installment
not to exceed the highest lawful contract rate. KRS 371.270(1). Similar pro-
visions have been enacted in many states. Comment, supra note 23, at 578.33 Britton & Ulrich, supra note 22, at 172.
34 This is a common provision in retail installment sales acts, but it is doubtful
whether such a provision will have any substantial effect. Comment, supra note
23, at 575.
35 KRS 371.270(2).
36 Toavoid confusion with other retail charge plans not involving a finance or
service charge, the transaction will be referred to as a revolving credit plan.
[Vol. 52,
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in this country offers a revolving credit plan.37 Under the typical
plan the retail buyer agrees to pay an installment of a certain amount
each month in return for the privilege of "charging" purchases at the
department store over an indefinite period of time. Usually a credit
limit is fixed beyond which the outstanding indebtedness may not
reach. The outstanding indebtedness of the buyer consists of the
amount of purchases plus the service (finance) charge less the
aggregate amount of monthly installments paid. Such a plan is con-
venient to the buyer since he may purchase department store goods
as his needs require at any time by setting up a schedule of monthly
payments that his budget will withstand. The buyer's convenience
means increasing sales for the department store. Since it would be in
the interest of the department store to encourage the buyer to pur-
chase from it rather than from a competitor, it might seem that abuses
in revolving credit plans would be rare. However, the volume of
such transactions probably justifies special regulative legislation.
The act provides for essentially the same disclosure requirments
as in the installment sales contract.38 However, the chief problem in
revolving credit transactions is the finance charge. Most revolving
credit plans add at the beginning of the month a charge of 1V per
cent per month on the outstanding indebtedness at the end of the
month. This would amount to eighteen per cent annually. But if a
purchase was made on the last day of the month and the account was
billed the next day, the finance rate would be 540 per cent annually. 39
Such charges are clearly over the maximum set by the usury statutes.
But do the usury laws apply to revolving credit plans? Since the
revolving credit plan is relatively new, there is no precise authority on
this point. However, since there are cases holding similar charge
account transactions not subject to the usury statutes,40 revolving credit
plans will probably be held to be outside the usury statutes.41 Because
of this doubt and for the protection of the consumer, states regulating
revolving credit plans should prescribe maximum finance charges.
The original draft of the act provided for such a maximum.42 But
such measures were excluded from the present act. The act provides
only that the maximum amount or rate of the finance charge must be
stated in the revolving credit agreement.43
3 7 Comment, supra note 14, at 832.
38 KS 371.300.
39 See Doyle, Charges for Revolving Credit and Charge Accounts, Subject for
Scrutiny, 12 Personal Finance L.Q. 33 (1958).
40 Comment, supra note 14, at 337 n.35.
4 1 But see Doyle, supra note 39.
42 S. 97, Ky. Legis. Regular Sess. (1962) (original draft).43 KRS 371.800 (1).
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REGULATORY FATxu.ms NOT INCLUDED
Finance Charges. The great increase in retail installment sales
over the years has tended to magnify abuses in the area. Finance
charges are at the heart of the abuses. 44 The reason for state regula-
tion of these charges is not economic policy, but simply to prevent the
exaction of exorbitant charges from an unwary buyer. It is a question
of fiscal morality, not economics.45 Yet, invariably, financing agencies
have opposed such regulation. However, it would appear that the
regulation of the finance charge would be to the advantage of the
financing agency. First, maximum finance charges would fix a legal
standard making an offender of the more "fly-by-night" financier. Such
financiers are the ones who damage the reputation of the entire sales
financing industry. Second, the usual statutory rate maxima sub-
stantially exceed the prevailing competitive rates for finance charges. 46
When the maximum finance charge rate is geared to the needs of the
consumer financing business, it would seem that such regulation
would not be detrimental to the interests of the financing agency.
Of the thirty-two states enacting retail installment sales legislation,
a majority limit finance charges on installment motor vehicles sales,
while only six states regulate rates on all tangible personal property.
47
Why have states limited finance charge regulation to motor vehicle
sales? Volume can not be the reason since installment motor vehicle
sales exceed other installment sales only by about one-third.48 The
reason probably lies in the substantial difference in the amount of
credit allowed in a motor vehicle sale and a non-vehicular sale. Since
the cost to the financing agency of processing a low balance install-
ment sale is substantially the same as that of a high balance sale, the
finance charge on a hundred-dollar appliance must be a greater
percentage of the balance due than the finance charge on a thousand-
dollar automobile.49 Therefore, it is relatively simple to draft a
statute just for automobiles,50 but difficult to draw up a statute that
44 Of the thirty-one states (excluding Kentucky) enacting retail installment
sales legislation, a majority limit finance charges on motor vehicle sales only. The
Kentucky motor vehicle sales act is in KRS ch. 190. KRS 190.110 fixes the max-
inmum finance charges on automobiles. Six states regulate finance charges on all
tangible personal property. Ind. Stat. Ann. § 58-926 (1951); Kan. Laws Spec.
Sess. 1958, ch. 9, § 2(a), at 29; N. Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 404; N. D. Laws 1957,
ch. 322 § 3, at 627; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1817.06; Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-
2aB(3) (1953).45 Warren, supra note 12, at 854.46 Warren, supra note 12, at 854 n.52.
47 Doyle, supra note 39.
48 19 Fed. Reserve Bull., op. cit. supra note 2.
49 Warren, supra note 12, at 855.
50 The Kentucky motor vehicle sales act puts finance charges on motor
vehicles in three classes: nine dollars per hundred on a vehicle not more than
(Continued on next page)
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will fairly regulate the finance charges on the sale of all types of
tangible personal property.
The original draft of the present act fixed the permissible finance
charge rate on the amount of the unpaid balance: on so much of the
principal balance as does not exceed three hundred dollars, fifteen
dollars per hundred per year; on so much of the principal balance as
exceeds three hundred dollars, twelve dollars per hundred per year
on that portion over three hundred dollars up to one thousand dollars;
on so much of the principal balance as exceeds one thousand dollars,
ten dollars per hundred per year on that portion over one thousand
dollars.51 But these regulatory measures were excluded from the
present act. Presumably, the sky is still the limit as to finance charges.
Interestingly, of the six states limiting finance charges on all personal
property, three have fixed the permissive rate upon the amount of the
unpaid balance, as did the original draft to the new act.52 Yet, the
maximum permissive finance charge in these three states is sub-
stantially less than in the original draft to the present actl There is
no indication in these states of an exodus of financing agencies from
the consumer financing field. If a statute providing maximum rates
in these states is workable, presumably a higher maximum in Kentucky
would not be damaging to those engaged in consumer financing.
CONCLUSION
Volume clearly justifies regulation of the retail installment sale,
but because of the distinction that the courts have drawn between
the direct loan and the time sale, such regulation must come from the
state legislatures. Disclosure is the basic philosophy of state install-
ment sales legislation. The new act contains the standard disclosure
provisions. The act also addresses itself to the important problems of
rebate upon prepayment, consolidation, delinquency charges, re-
financing, and revolving credit. At the heart of the installment sale
is the problem of finance charges. Clearly, the usury statutes have
not afforded the consumer the protection that he deserves. The new
act does not contain finance charge limitations, although proposed in
the original draft of the act. It is hoped that the experience of those
states which do have finance charge maxima will act as an inducement
to supplement the present act to include this all-important safeguard.
Charles S. Whiteiwad
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
one year old; thirteen dollars per hundred on a vehicle not more than two years
old; fifteen dollars per hundred on all others. KRS 190.110.
51 S. 97, Ky. Legis. Regular Sess. (1962) (original draft).
5
2 Kan. Laws Spec. Sess. 1958, ch. 9, § 8(a), at 19-20; N. Y. Pers. Prop. Law
§ 404 (1959); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1317.06 (1962).
1964] NomE
